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Liquid's SHRINCS test: post-quantum Merkle signatures

By Leon Acosta5 min read

Also mentioned

SLH-DSASLH-DSAStateless Hash-based Digital Signature AlgorithmStateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm, the NIST-standardized signature scheme derived from SPHINCS+ and specified in FIPS 205.Read the full entry (new tab), FIPSFIPSFederal Information Processing StandardFederal Information Processing Standards, publicly announced standards developed by NIST for use in U.S. government computer systems, including cryptographic algorithms and modules.Read the full entry (new tab), NISTNISTNational Institute of Standards and TechnologyThe U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, the agency that develops and publishes cryptographic standards, including the FIPS series and post-quantum algorithms.Read the full entry (new tab), PQCPQCpost-quantum cryptographyCryptographic algorithms designed to run on today's classical computers while remaining secure against attacks by both classical and future quantum computers.Read the full entry (new tab) are defined in the glossary.

TL;DR

Read this first

On March 3, 2026, Blockstream Research demonstrated post-quantum signature verification in real Liquid mainnet transactions using Simplicity and a SHRINCS verifier. SHRINCS is not SPHINCS+: it combines a compact stateful Merkle-tree signature path with a stateless fallback related to SLH-DSA, the standardized descendant of SPHINCS+. The test proves that these spending conditions can execute without a Liquid consensus change. It does not make Liquid, its peg or Bitcoin post-quantum secure.

What was actually tested on Liquid

Blockstream's March 3 announcement identifies two Liquid mainnet transactions: one spent with the stateful SHRINCS path and another with the stateless recovery path. The spending condition was expressed in Simplicity, which permitted signature verification as an opt-in contract rather than a protocol-wide change. The published demonstration is evidence for this verifier and transaction path, not an independent cryptographic audit.

That distinction matters for a PQC migration roadmap. Replacing one spending authorization mechanism is different from replacing every signature, commitment and operational key across a network. A useful cryptographic inventory must identify the protection boundary actually exercised.

How the Merkle tree authenticates a one-time signing key

In a stateful Merkle signature scheme, the public key commits to a tree of one-time signature public keys. A signer reveals one one-time signature and the sibling hashes along that leaf's path to the root. The verifier recomputes the root and compares it with the committed public key. The security comes from hash functions and a disciplined rule: a one-time signing key must not be reused. The Merkle path authenticates the leaf; it does not remove the need to manage signing state.

  • Commit to many one-time public keys through a Merkle root.
  • Sign a transaction digest with a previously unused one-time key.
  • Include the authentication path so the verifier can reconstruct the root.
  • Advance persistent signing state before another signature can reuse the same leaf.
  • If state is missing or unreliable, use a separately designed stateless fallback rather than guessing the next leaf.

The SHRINCS technical description specifies a flexible XMSS (FXMSS) stateful component using WOTS+C leaves. Unlike a conventional balanced tree, its structure can favor short authentication paths for early signatures, which is useful when a blockchain key is likely to sign only a few spends.

Why SHRINCS is not simply SPHINCS+

Scheme or componentSigning modelRole
SPHINCS+ / SLH-DSAStatelessNIST-standardized hash-based signature family; avoids tracking one-time leaf consumption at the cost of larger signatures
FXMSS with WOTS+CStatefulCompact Merkle-path signatures; one-time leaves require strict usage tracking
SHRINCSBoth paths under one public keyCompact stateful signing with a stateless fallback based on a nonstandard SLH-DSA parameterization
Different roles within the hash-based signature family.

SHRINCS deliberately combines both approaches. Its stateless fallback derives from SLH-DSA, which is based on SPHINCS+, but its optimized stateful path uses a different flexible Merkle-tree construction. Calling the Liquid transactions a deployment of SPHINCS+ would confuse the standard scheme with a distinct research design. The SHRINCS research explanation describes this combination and its backup trade-off.

324-byte signatures are not 324-byte transactions

ItemReported sizeWhat it measures
First stateful SHRINCS signature324 bytesCryptographic signature at the cited parameterization
Additional stateful signature under the same keyAbout 16 bytes more per subsequent signatureGrowth of the Merkle authentication path in the described configuration
Full Liquid demonstration transactionAbout 38 KBTransaction including the Simplicity verification program and execution-related overhead
Published sizes for the demonstration, not general network-wide performance measurements.

Blockstream reports compact 324-byte first-use stateful signatures, while the full test transaction was closer to 38 KB. Confusing those figures would understate on-chain costs. The initial signature-size advantage is real within the stated construction, but verifier representation, execution budget, witness structure and eventual native-opcode design determine the cost of a deployed system. The March deployment also used transaction space filled with the Bitcoin whitepaper to satisfy Liquid's size-to-computation constraint.

Pitfall

The static backup does not preserve used-leaf state

SHRINCS can recover signing capability from a static seed through its stateless path. It does not mean the recovered device can safely resume using a previously backed-up stateful leaf index. Reusing a one-time key is a security failure. Recovery procedures need explicit rules and tests.

What the experiment proves, and what remains open

The achievement is architectural: an existing production Bitcoin sidechain could verify a new post-quantum spending rule using expressive contracts. It provides practical evidence that a hash-based signature verifier can be encoded and executed, and that both normal and fallback spending flows can be demonstrated on-chain.

The limits are equally concrete. At announcement, Blockstream stated that the implementation still needed broader auditing, specification work and wallet integration. The Bitcoin peg, Confidential Assets commitments and Liquid's block-signing consensus protocol were still classically secured. A post-quantum transaction spending path cannot compensate for classical trust boundaries elsewhere.

The May proposal for OP_CHECKSHRINCS explores a more efficient native Bitcoin verification path. That is a research and protocol proposal, not an activated Bitcoin opcode. It also raises crypto-agility questions about versioning, wallet support, validation cost and consensus risk.

What to test before treating this as a migration option

  • Reproduce stateful and stateless verification with pinned source revisions and published test vectors.
  • Prove power-loss, rollback and duplicated-device cases never reuse a stateful one-time signing key.
  • Measure complete transaction bytes and verification cost, not merely signature length.
  • Verify how wallets encode spending conditions, recover funds and signal signature-mode changes.
  • Threat-model the peg, federation signing, confidentiality commitments and any classical fallback separately.
  • Track specification stability, independent review, hardware-wallet support and any future Bitcoin consensus proposal.

For an audit or migration program, keep two labels separate: demonstrated post-quantum spend verification and network-wide post-quantum security. The first was shown on Liquid in March 2026. The second was not.

References

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